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Abstract
In this article, I show why it is necessary to abolish the use of predictive algorithms 
in the US criminal justice system at sentencing. After presenting the functioning 
of these algorithms in their context of emergence, I offer three arguments to dem-
onstrate why their abolition is imperative. First, I show that sentencing based on 
predictive algorithms induces a process of rewriting the temporality of the judged 
individual, flattening their life into a present inescapably doomed by its past. Sec-
ond, I demonstrate that recursive processes, comprising predictive algorithms and 
the decisions based on their predictions, systematically suppress outliers and pro-
gressively transform reality to match predictions. In my third and final argument, 
I show that decisions made on the basis of predictive algorithms actively perform 
a biopolitical understanding of justice as management and modulation of risks. In 
such a framework, justice becomes a means to maintain a perverse social homeosta-
sis that systematically exposes disenfranchised Black and Brown populations to risk.
Keywords Predictive algorithms · Cybernetics · Criminal justice · Social justice · 
Biopolitics
1 Introduction
The idea of a society governed by predictive algorithms has become a common 
foundational trope of mainstream cultural productions within the past 20 years. In 
the film Minority Report (2002), the job of John Anderton—the main protagonist 
played by Tom Cruise—is to arrest people before they commit a murder. While the 
crime is pre-viewed by the Precogs—prescient human beings kept in a state of artifi-
cial coma—John’s job is to interpret the images extracted from their brains to deter-
mine where the murders will be committed. The predictive dispositive in Minority 
Report is characterized by a mix of enhanced human ability with technologies of 
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extraction and the recording of information. Danny Witwer, whose job is to audit the 
Precrime Unit and evaluate its procedure, asks John: “But it’s not the future if you 
stop it. Isn’t that a fundamental paradox?” In response, John throws him a wooden 
ball on which the name of a perpetrator had been imprinted. As Danny catches the 
ball before it falls, John answers: “The fact that you prevented it from happening 
does not change the fact that it was going to happen.”
More recently, the series Westworld (2016–) grapples with the relation between 
artificial intelligence and issues of self-determination, memory, and the exploita-
tion of A.I.-endowed humanoids by humans during violent roleplays. The exploi-
tive relationship between humans and machines gets overturned when one of the 
humanoid machines—Dolores—kills her creator during a mass shooting perpetrated 
by the machines against humans. In the third season of Westworld (2020), Dolores 
is attacked and badly wounded. She is saved by Caleb, a socially outcast human. 
Dolores explains to Caleb that since it has been algorithmically predicted that he 
will end up killing himself, he is not deemed worthy of any social investment: “They 
won’t invest in someone who’s going to kill himself. But by not investing, they 
ensure the outcome.” The prediction of Caleb’s fate triggers a feedback loop that 
might well achieve the prediction.
From Minority Report to Westworld, one notices a shift from a determinis-
tic toward a probabilistic model of the world. While predictions in the first model 
accomplish themselves because the future is known by creatures with the godlike 
ability of foresight, predictions are realized in the probabilistic model through a 
complex process of data-gathering and processing, and decision-making based on 
the algorithmically produced predictions. However, their results are the same: the 
predicted future is inescapable.
The above cultural productions depict neo-liberal society as characterized by its 
exclusive focus on risk management, a process by which every course of action is 
evaluated in terms of calculated risk and its return on investment. Subsequently, the 
result of such evaluations is directly fed back into the processes of decision-making. 
Risks are “calculated” because neo-liberal capitalist societies do not seek to exclude 
risk per se. Rather, they rely on using risk as a motor for carefully planned change 
as a mode of governance. As Stefano Harney and Fred Moten insist in The Under-
commons, this mode of governance submits the population—primarily the disen-
franchised and racialized portion of it—to increasingly higher levels of contingency, 
flexibility, and thus risk (Harney & Moten, 2013, pp. 76–79). This deliberate insta-
bility, which weakens social ties, renders individuals susceptible to ongoing adjust-
ment and control. Following the recursive logic of the regulation and control of soci-
ety through risk management tools, the future escapes the program less and less; its 
openness diminishes with every optimization.
1.1  Literature Review
For the past two decades, predictive algorithms called “risk assessment tools” have 
been widely used by state courts of the US criminal justice system for judicial deci-
sion-making in regard to a defendant’s access to rehabilitative programs, and the 
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granting of probation and parole. More recently, they have been used to help deter-
mine the sentence of an offender. The reason advanced by the proponents of these 
tools is that they “reduce recidivism and increase public safety” (State of Wiscon-
sin v. Eric L. Loomis, 2016, §2). Justifying their use, they argue that algorithmic 
tools would achieve this by being more transparent and accurate in their prediction 
of recidivism than a judge’s assessment.
Both the objectivity and efficiency of these algorithmic tools have recently come 
under scrutiny in many studies—among which a broadly discussed inquiry by Pro-
Publica (Angwin et al., 2016). Existing critiques of predictive tools generally focus 
on issues of lack of transparency and the biases ingrained into the algorithms and 
data they are trained on and which reflect firmly rooted societal biases (Noble, 
2018). One of the main arguments in this broader public discourse is that algorithms 
conceal that they are the product of human decision-making at every stage of the 
process of their production and that the data they are trained on reflect the racist 
and classist biases of the society that produces them. This leads to the naturalization 
of contested categories, foreclosing them to political discussions (Eubanks, 2018) 
(O’Neil, 2016) (Benjamin, 2019). The black box character of algorithms, which is 
in important part caused by their proprietary nature, makes their functioning opaque 
and inaccessible to the public (Brauneis & Goodman, 2018). Following Campolo 
and Crawford, the conjunction of the accuracy of predictions with the inaccessibil-
ity and the opacity of predictive algorithms grants these algorithms a magical power 
or “enchanted determinism” that allows their producers and users to remove them-
selves from the responsibility tied to their decisions (Campolo & Crawford, 2020).
On the other hand, a significant amount of research is invested into questioning 
these critiques and justifying the use of predictive algorithms. This research seeks to 
compare the human ability to make accurate predictions to its algorithmic counter-
parts (Lin et al., 2020). Discussions revolve around the necessary tradeoff between 
fairness and public safety (Barabas et al., 2017). From this perspective, the problem 
of accuracy and biases is overcome through technical adjustments in the computa-
tional model: a better adjustment of the tool should allow the resolution accuracy 
issues and minimize biases (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017). The question of fairness 
is posed in statistical terms. Fairness becomes a question of tradeoff between the 
equality in treatment between racial groups and considerations around public safety. 
Depending on how fairness is defined, one can argue that the use of algorithms is 
fair and even fairer than human decision. Recently, Wong (2020) has appropriately 
argued that in a democracy, the definition of fairness should be the product of politi-
cal decision, rather than be left to statistical considerations. These statistical consid-
erations around fairness are justified by a consequentialist understanding of justice 
(Card & Smith, 2020). From a consequentialist standpoint, risk assessment algo-
rithms appear as adequate and efficient means to an end, which consists in assuring 
public safety while better managing limited public resources. I do not argue from 
a consequentialist perspective because I consider it part and parcel of the issues I 
subsequently address. In addition, I understand the consequentialist framework as 
computational at its core in that it consists in the calculus of the means toward an 
end deemed “good.” The issue I see with this approach is that no calculus can ever 
ground this “good.” As a norm, the “good”—in the case of justice, “fairness”—is 
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the object of an always-contestable decision—here, for instance, between “pub-
lic safety” and “racial fairness.”1 What a society decides is fair can never be fully 
grounded through calculation and must instead be instituted (Benjamin, 1996). The 
norm in any consequentialist and utilitarian framework is a blind spot that escapes 
the paradigm of the calculus of the means. Because this norm is itself the object 
of a contestable decision, any decision oriented toward it entails an undecidable or 
incomputable. By understanding decision-making in terms of pure calculation, the 
consequentialist framework implies a lack of perception toward the incomputable 
comprising any decision. If justice can never be the sole product of a calculus due to 
the ungroundable character of fairness, then the utilitarian, consequentialist frame-
work hinders the discussion of issues tied to algorithmic-aided decision-making. 
Instead, it is necessary to move beyond this framework.
1.2  Arguments
While fully acknowledging the importance of approaches criticizing the racially 
biased character of algorithms and their lack of transparency, my line of inquiry 
differs significantly from the approaches above. Matters of transparency and bias, 
while important, leave other fundamental philosophical issues unchallenged; this is 
what I seek to tackle in this paper. These issues broadly regard the rewriting of the 
future induced by predictive tools tied to their recursive logic and the implicit under-
standing of justice as risk management. Following Gregory Bateson, I understand 
“recursivity” as the regulating logic by which the informational result of an algo-
rithmic process is fed back into the system and influences the subsequent process 
(Bateson, 1979, pp. 126–127). The algorithmic rewriting of the future results in the 
exclusion of unprogrammed futures in favor of a future normatively deemed right or 
good. This “good” becomes all the more unquestionable as it seems to “naturally” 
result from algorithmic computation.
In this paper, I show that predictive tools cannot be salvaged for justice purposes 
and call for the abolition of risk assessment algorithms. In the Black radical tradi-
tion that informs my argument, abolition is not simply about repealing or destroying 
something; it is constructive and transformative.2 Why then call for the abolition of 
what appears to only be a tool for judicial decision-making? As I argue based on the 
work of Karen Barad, N. Katherine Hayles and on Media Studies, a tool is never 
solely a tool, that is, an external, independent appendage that can be added to or 
removed from a system. Rather, technology emerges from and is conditioned by a 
1 A whole other paper would need to address what is considered as “public safety” here and whose inter-
ests and lives are prioritized in these considerations around safety. A lot of implicit norms are at play that 
are not solvable through computation.
2 I am following here the call for abolition formulated by Davis (2005, pp. 72–73). And then reformu-
lated by Stefano Harney and Fred Moten in Harney and Moten (2013, p. 42): “What is, so to speak, the 
object of abolition? Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have 
prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination 
of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society.”.
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society that it, in turn, transforms.3 The logic that predictive algorithms operational-
ize, and which I characterize as recursive, have existed in western society since the 
rise of biopolitics in the nineteenth century. However, this logic is accentuated and 
naturalized through the apparent objectivity of algorithms. In that sense, abolish-
ing the use of predictive tools goes hand-in-hand with questioning the conception 
of justice as risk management. In short, calling for the abolition of a “tool” means 
questioning the socio-technological dispositive without which there is no such tool. 
Repealing a dispositive never just means repealing the concrete material stuff of 
which the dispositive is made, but also simultaneously repealing its implicit theo-
retical framework. It implies rethinking the framework so that the material disposi-
tive is not justifiable anymore. If one agrees to repealing predictive algorithms for 
the reasons I discuss in this paper, this necessarily entails questioning the reduction 
of criminal justice to the management of risks.
In what follows, I will outline three arguments to demonstrate that predictive 
tools should be abolished. My first argument regards who and what is judged when 
algorithmic tools constitute the basis for sentencing. Some researchers argue that 
the use of algorithmic tools for the purposes of justice leads to highly individual-
ized evaluation thanks to the breadth of gathered data and other factors taken into 
account. Others consider that these evaluations are problematic because of their gen-
eralized character. I will show that the issue is not one of generalization vs. par-
ticularization. Instead, it is about the rewriting of temporality induced by the use of 
predictive tools.
Second, I will discuss how the use of algorithms transforms a probabilistic vision 
of the future into a deterministic one thanks to the decisional, and thus performa-
tive, character of justice. I mean performativity in its classical Austinian sense: the 
effect that a speech-act has on reality (Austin, 1962). Sentencing as a decision is an 
obvious speech-act, as it affects a very concrete change in the life of the sentenced 
individual as well as their family and community. Judicial procedures function as 
techno-political practices, in which the material conditions of computation and the 
performative power of decision are inextricably entangled. Algorithms alone neither 
describe nor determine the future. Rather, I argue, decisions based on algorithmic 
predictions create a reality that progressively confirms existing predictions—lead-
ing to a de facto determinism that has nothing to do with algorithmic omniscience. 
I will demonstrate that feedback processes, far from correcting predictions and thus 
decisions based on them, systematically suppress the outliers, transforming reality to 
match predictions.
In my third and final argument, I will show that decision-making premised on 
predictive algorithms repeatedly performs a biopolitical understanding of justice as 
the management and modulation of risks. Justice becomes a means to maintain a 
3 I rely here on three similar ways of thinking about this co-shaping relationship. Recent German media 
theory speaks of “cultural technique” (Siegert, 2013). The media philosopher and historian of cyber-
netics N. Catherine Hayles speaks of “technogenesis” (Hayles 2012). Building on Niels Bohr’s thought 




perverse homeostasis—understood here as the conservation of a given state of the 
system—that implies systematically exposing disenfranchised Black and Brown 
populations to deadly risks. This final argument is based on a rereading of Michel 
Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics as a specific kind of power exerted by the 
western states since the nineteenth century. Unlike sovereign power, biopower does 
not wield upon the individual body as much as it aims to manage and regulate a 
population in its entirety, its birth and death rate, and its health (Foucault, 2003). 
Instead, I aim to show that the risk-management framework of the criminal justice 
system should be understood not from the perspective of an entire population’s man-
agement, but from the perspective of which population is systematically exposed to 
risks.
The performance of justice that comes to light through my three arguments is in 
conflict with a democratic understanding of justice where, following Jacques Der-
rida, the act of justice has to “always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable 
groups and lives, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation” (Derrida, 1990, 
p. 949). I base my argument on Derrida’s definition of justice because it is a classi-
cal definition similar to the one found in the Institutes of Justinian—one of the foun-
dational texts of the western legal system.4 Moreover, I regard any definition that 
does not have the singularity and irreplaceability of the judged individual at its core 
as incompatible with democracy.
Algorithmic justice does not serve retribution or rehabilitation. Instead, it reveals 
itself as a mechanism of biopolitical regulation and control. My three arguments 
shall lay bare that correcting and optimizing predictive algorithms will not solve 
the issues brought to light in this paper because these corrective mechanisms do not 
question the problematic framework of risk management itself.
To substantiate my arguments, it is essential to first understand the functioning of 
these algorithms in their context of emergence. I will focus on COMPAS (by Equiv-
ant, formerly known as Northpointe Inc.) as a case study, as it is one of the most 
widely used predictive algorithms in the US criminal justice system.
2  COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profile 
for Alternative Sanctions) in Context
Risk assessment tools are not a new phenomenon. Actuarial tools have been in 
use in the US justice system since the 1960s. Among older predictive tools was 
the “Salient Factor Score” used from 1973 until the 1990s (Hoffman & Adelberg, 
1980). However, the scope of the tool was limited as it provided an evaluation based 
on only 7 factors (against 137 with COMPAS) (Hoffman & Adelberg, 1980, p. 49). 
Factors on which the offender has little influence—like education, employment, 
family, and even their age at the first offense—were progressively removed from the 
evaluation in later versions of the tool (Tonry, 2014, p. 168).
4 Cf.: “Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render to everyone their due” (Holland, 1881, p. 4).
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Predictive algorithms like COMPAS belong to the 4th generation of such tools 
(Brennan et al., 2009, p. 21; Hamilton, 2014, p. 238). COMPAS is one of the most 
widely used risk assessment algorithms in US courts. These tools are generally pro-
prietary, so the public does not have access to their content or their exact function-
ing. While the goal of the “Salient Factor Score” was to predict the chances of suc-
cess of rehabilitative measures, COMPAS focuses on the evaluation of an offender’s 
recidivism risk as well as their specific “needs” (social, psychological, etc.) for reha-
bilitative purposes. Unlike previous tools like the “Salient Factor Score,” COMPAS 
is used for sentencing. As a consequence, an individual who scores high on the risk 
of recidivism portion will likely spend more time in prison than if they were judged 
solely based on their offense.
Tools like COMPAS were designed in the context of a new conception of judi-
cial practices called evidence-based practices (EBP). The declared goal of the 
EBP approach is to increase the financial efficiency of the criminal justice system 
while decreasing the prison population by more efficiently evaluating who should 
be granted parole or probation. EBP would also help determine what rehabilitative 
measures would be efficient for which kind of offenders (Couzens, 2011, p. 2). Fol-
lowing Cecelia Klingele, the EBP approach established itself after years of a puni-
tive conception of justice that rejected rehabilitative measures as inefficient and, 
from the 1970s on, had led to a massive increase in the prison population (Klingele, 
2016, p. 540). The specificity of EBP’s methodology is that it relies on a statistical 
approach to judicial procedures.
It is worth taking a closer look at the way the COMPAS tool presents its results. 
It produces a report, which consists of two sections (cf. Appendix). The upper sec-
tion “Overall Risk Potential” contains the evaluation of the overall recidivism risk 
(“recidivism,” “violence,” “failure to appear,” “community compliance”) on a scale 
of 1 to 10: 1 being the lowest risk, 10 the highest.5 The lower section of the report 
titled “Criminogenic and Needs Profile” attributes scores to factors or “predictors” 
said to influence the risk of recidivism. There are two kinds of predictors: the static 
ones and the dynamic ones. Static predictors are those that belong to the history 
of the offender and cannot be changed: age, gender, and race fall into such predic-
tors. As predictors like education, socioeconomic status, substance abuse, and social 
adjustment problems are susceptible to change and are potential targets of rehabilita-
tive measures, they are considered dynamic (Hamilton, 2014, p. 237). The assess-
ment based on these factors in the second section of the COMPAS report extends 
from the history of previous criminal involvement to “substance abuse,” “social 
environment,” “criminal thinking,” criminality in the family, “socialization failure,” 
“social isolation,” and so on (see Appendix). While the first section was “developed 
using methods and strategies for predictive modeling” and enables “discriminat[ion] 
between offenders who will and will not recidivate” (emphasis mine), the scores in 
the second section “are not meant to be predictive but aim simply and accurately 
5 It is to note that the assessment retrieved by ProPublica and shown in the Appendix is dated 2006. 




to describe the offender (Northpointe Inc., 2015, p. 7).” (Note Northpointe’s use of 
the future tense, which is significant for my argument.) The scores in both sections 
result from comparing the data of the offender with the data of the “norm group.” 
Even if the scores of the second section are not meant to be predictive, the data tied 
to these scores contribute to determining the overall risk of recidivism.
Data on the individual are “gathered from the offender’s criminal file and an 
interview with the defendant” (State of Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis, 2016, §13) 
during which the offender must answer the 137 questions on the “COMPAS Core” 
questionnaire. One of these questionnaires has been retrieved by ProPublica and 
is available online.6 The scope of the questions used to assess the defendant is 
extremely broad. The individual is not only evaluated based on their history but on 
factors about which they have no or very limited influence like age, criminality in 
the family, socioeconomic background, or criminality in the neighborhood, among 
others. The answers of the assessed individual are then compared to the score of the 
“norm group.” The dataset of the norm group consists of over “30,000 COMPAS 
Core assessments conducted between January 2004 and November 2005 at prison, 
parole, jail, and probation sites across the United States.”7
As Northpointe Practitioner’s Guide shows, COMPAS associates the assessed 
individual to a type of criminal. COMPAS distinguishes between eight categories 
of male criminals and eight categories of female criminals (Northpointe Inc., 2015, 
pp. 50–57). The algorithm classifies each offender into a typical profile. Northpointe 
points out that no offender ever fully matches their class. However, the classification 
supposedly helps “treatment staff conceptualize the ‘kind’ of client they are dealing 
with” (Northpointe Inc., 2015, p. 47). Such categorizations are not a novelty. Typol-
ogies of criminals were created as early as the 1930s (Harcourt, 2007, p. 180 f.). Far 
from being objective, these typologies are influenced by the values of the society 
from which they originate. 1930’s typologies were shaped by moral values and were 
criticized for their arbitrariness (Harcourt, 2007, p. 181). COMPAS categories, on 
the other hand, bear the traces of the 1980s war on drugs and the criminalization of 
addiction; the first category of male offenders is “Chronic drug abusers – most non-
violent” (Northpointe Inc., 2015, p. 50).
While COMPAS is gender-sensitive—which can be considered further problematic 
since individuals are judged differently based on a factor for which they bear no respon-
sibility (Tonry, 2014, p. 171)—Northpointe’s handbook does not mention race as a fac-
tor influencing the risk of recidivism score. However, this does not mean—and by a 
longshot—that race is not an integral part of the predictions. It has been shown that 
factors like neighborhood, socioeconomic status, e.g., which are used as predictors in 
6 See https:// www. docum entcl oud. org/ docum ents/ 27021 03- Sample- Risk- Asses sment- COMPAS- CORE, 
last accessed May 10, 2021.
7 Northpointe Inc. (2015, p. 11): “The Composite Norm Group consists of assessments from state pris-
ons and parole agencies (33.8%); jails (13.6%); and probation agencies (52.6%). The Core Norm includes 
7,381 offenders. Men represent 76.9% of the Core Norm Group (n = 5,681), and women represent 23.1% 
of the Core Norm Group (n = 1,700). The median age at assessment is 31.0 (M = 32.6) in the Core Norm 
Group. The racial composition of the Core Norm Group is 61.6% Caucasian, 24.9% Black, 10.3% Latino 
and 3.2% other racial groups.”.
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COMPAS to evaluate recidivism risk, function as proxies for racial categories because 
of the still largely segregated American society (O’Neil, 2016; Mbadiwe, 2018, p. 19). 
Therefore, race does not need to be explicitly stated in the COMPAS Core question-
naire to influence the risk score of an individual by proxy. In short, no algorithm that 
takes socioeconomic factors and social environment into account is race-neutral.
From an evidence-based perspective, it is assumed that thanks to such an “objective 
statistical assessment” (Northpointe Inc., 2015, p. 3) tool, justice would become fairer 
and less prone to prejudice and bias (especially racial ones) by providing an “objective” 
evaluation of the offender. With an accuracy rate of 65%, a 2018 study by Dressel and 
Farid shows that COMPAS is not better at predicting the recidivism risk of an offender 
any more than a nonexpert participant asked to do the same when provided with “a 
short description of a defendant that included the defendant’s sex, age, and previous 
criminal history, but not their race” (Dressel & Farid, 2018, p. 1), while in compari-
son, COMPAS bases its predictions on 137 features (Dressel & Farid, 2018, p. 2). Fur-
thermore, in comparing the rate of false negatives and false positives, the study shows 
that human participants and COMPAS results “are similarly unfair to black defendants” 
(Dressel & Farid, 2018, p. 2). Other researchers have more recently argued that algo-
rithms are more accurate than humans depending on the circumstances and recommend 
to include even more risk factors in the hope of increasing the accuracy of algorithmic 
predictions (Lin et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the US criminal justice system is gathering a 
vast amount of data that has little to nothing to do with the offenses for which an indi-
vidual is judged. Seen in this light, risk assessment tools appear as instruments of mas-
sive control applied to every aspect of an individual’s life.
With the evidence of such questionable results, one might wonder how these 
tools could become so essential to judicial procedures. The aura of efficiency and 
objectivity associated with risk assessment tools appears to have made decision-
makers oblivious to the evidence that shows otherwise. For instance, while the State 
of Wisconsin acknowledges the limitations of risk assessment tools in a 2016 court 
decision, it still maintains that the court will make use of these tools for sentencing, 
referring to the aforementioned evidence-based practices (State of Wisconsin v. Eric 
L. Loomis, 2016, §66).
Here, I want to reemphasize the limitations of the research that focusses on the 
measurement of fairness and accuracy in algorithms. Measurements might show that 
algorithms are doing a slightly better job than judges, which, from an EBP (con-
sequentialist) standpoint, should suffice to justify their use. However, such a dis-
cussion presupposes that we accept to reduce justice to the management of risks 
and resources, and that we equate judicial decision-making with computation. It 
is this conception of justice that I question in order to demonstrate its problematic 
character.
3  The Performativity of Predictions
In what follows, I will bring us a step further than the often-invoked biased character 
of risk assessment tools toward minorities. Again, algorithmic biases are a funda-
mental, yet not surprising issue given that these algorithms are trained on datasets 
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that are the products of a society suffering from structural racism. The point I would 
like to make is not that algorithms like COMPAS could or should be improved or 
optimized; improvement procedures presuppose the reduction of decision to compu-
tation, an assumption challenge in my third argument. Rather, their use at sentencing 
should be abolished.
3.1  Rewriting the Temporality of an Individual’s Life
It is considered self-evident in the US criminal justice system that individuals are 
not judged solely on the offense that brought them before the judge, but that the his-
tory of past offenses is taken into account at sentencing (Tonry, 2014, p. 172). One 
example of this is the “three-strikes law” applied in 30 out of 50 US states. Regard-
less of whether the offender was already punished with prison time for the first 
two offenses, by the third strike and in the case of a violent or serious offense, the 
offender faces a life sentence. This, however, should be viewed as far from evident, 
considering that the offender would have already been punished for their past crime. 
Criminologist Michael Tonry notes in a 2014 paper that the Scandinavian countries 
have a very different conception of punishment, as they deem that past offenses for 
which the offender has already been punished should not be taken into account at 
sentencing (Tonry, 2014, p. 172).
A new factor comes into play with predictive tools, however: the risk of future 
recidivism. This risk is evaluated based on the defendant’s criminal history but also 
on their overall recidivism risk in conjunction with the “class” of criminals to which 
the individual is attributed by the risk assessment tool. The data used to produce 
this evaluation do not solely belong to the individual. The predictors mentioned 
in “Sect.  2” are predictive only by comparing the individual’s data with the data 
of the norm group. As a result, the individual is judged relative to the category of 
criminal to which they are expected to belong. Generalization through datafication 
is problematic in regard to the conception of justice I mentioned earlier, which has 
to address the singularity of each case. If it does not, justice becomes nothing more 
than the automated application of general rules, no matter how different singular 
cases are from each other.
However, the question of the generalization of sentencing through datafication is 
not the one I would like to ask here. In fact, both individualization and generaliza-
tion happen in the assessment produced by predictive algorithms. Indeed, the algo-
rithm treats the offender in a highly individualized way when it comes to the amount 
and specificity of data gathered regarding that individual’s past8; on the other 
hand, it generalizes the data by simplification when it pertains to their future. As 
a result, the individual is judged relative to the category of criminal to which they 
are expected to belong—“expected” in the sense that predictions are probabilistic 
and do not amount to determinism. Probabilities only establish the frequency of an 
event occurring when another event takes place. For this reason, predictions do not 
8 Sociologist Bernard Harcourt questions the idea that the use of algorithms and statistics leads to a 
generalization away from the individual. On the contrary, he states: “The actuarial is better understood, 
instead, as the culmination or the zenith of the turn to the individualization of punishment” (Harcourt, 
2007, p. 110). Harcourt claims that the goal of risk assessment tools is not to generalize but to indi-
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establish a causal, necessary relation between both events. Producing a deterministic 
evaluation of the future of an individual would require—as is Minority Report—
deity-like prescience or a system that disposes of the knowledge of the integrality of 
the factors and causal intricacies at a given stage of an individual’s life on a quantum 
level.9 The algorithm necessary to compute the history of this individual would have 
to be exactly as long and complex as this history itself. It would thus be useless. Fol-
lowing the concept coined by the mathematician Gregory Chaitin, the individual’s 
history is incompressible: “… if the experimental data cannot be compressed, if the 
smallest program for calculating it is just as large as it is …, then the data is lawless, 
unstructured, patternless …. In a word, random, irreducible!” (Chaitin, 2005, p. 64). 
To predict the future of an individual necessitates discovering a pattern, and in order 
to do so, one must compare the data of the said individual to a dataset and thus give 
up their singularity. One has to trade off the certainty of an impossible determinism 
for the uncertainty of predictions. Patterning always already implies a simplification 
per generalization and, thus, a loss of certainty.
The question arising from this assessment is what allows a judge to act as if the 
future of an individual had already been lived. Indeed, no matter how many fac-
tors are included and processed by the predictive algorithm, the sentencing based 
on its result consists in judging a future that cannot be the future of the judged indi-
vidual as this singular future has yet to be lived. This future is open, undetermined. 
It has not happened yet. Probabilities of recidivism can be high, but they are just 
that: probabilities. To base a decision on a probable outcome which is the outcome 
of a class of individuals means to deny an individual the openness of their future, in 
other words, to deny the multiplicity of possible outcomes, while implicitly devolv-
ing to the individual the whole responsibility for the social conditions in which they 
grew up, these conditions being used against them when gathered for prediction pur-
poses. Incidentally, judging an individual based on a future that cannot be theirs can 
only be justified if justice is implicitly understood as the management of risks, while 
the present offense and the judged individual are secondary matters.
The denial of the indeterminacy of the individual’s future causes the temporality 
of the individual’s life to flatten into a present inescapably doomed by its past: the 
individual’s past is used to predict the future as if this future had already been lived, 
and this “as if” serves in turn to performatively determine their present through 
judicial decision-making. The point here is that the issue lies not so much in the 
existence of statistics and predictions; rather, it consists in the practice of basing 
9 This is by the way the scenario of a recent series, Devs (2020), by the director of the film Ex Machina, 
Alex Garland.
vidualize punishment as much as possible by taking the highest possible number of factors into account. 
However, as sociologist Katherine Beckett shows in the late 1990s, this use of statistics does not serve a 
better understanding of what causes an individual’s trajectory. Instead, it leads to disregard for the soci-
etal causes of crime (Beckett, 1999, p. 102). See also Klingele (2016, p. 574). With COMPAS, socioeco-
nomic factors are not taken into account to better comprehend what could lead a specific individual to 
commit a specific crime, resulting in a more lenient sentence. Rather, used to produce a prediction, these 




decisions on them for purposes of justice. The actual outcome—that the individual 
reoffends or does not reoffend—might match the predicted outcome, as in the case 
of an offender who was granted parole based on a low-risk score of recidivism and 
who does not reoffend. But in the case of a sentence to prison based on predictions 
of recidivism, there is no way to know what the actual outcome for this individual 
would have been. With such decisions, the future of this individual has been per-
formatively determined as lived—the “he will reoffend” in Northpointe Practition-
er’s Guide—before it could actually be lived. For this reason, it is highly problem-
atic to ground decisions about parole, probation, and time spent in a prison cell not 
on the present state and needs of an individual but on predictions about a future that 
cannot belong to the judged individual.
However, from the perspective of risk management, one would argue that society 
has both the right and good reason to protect itself from offenders by using all the 
knowledge and data at its disposal and that it is safer to falsely give a longer sentence 
to someone based on his or her risk of recidivism than freeing an individual by error 
who then happens to reoffend. This argument does not hold, as it has been proven 
that imprisonment does not make society safer: American prisons are criminogenic 
and imprisonment is highly detrimental to communities as it damages their social 
fabric (Clear, 2008).10 What Angela Y. Davis calls the “prison-industrial-complex” 
(Davis, 2005, p. 35) incarcerates Black people at a much higher rate than their white 
counterparts for similar offenses, thus systematically overexposing this population 
to the risks tied to prison.
3.2  Probabilities vs. Decisions
In this section, I will discuss how the use of algorithms transforms a probabilis-
tic vision of the future into a deterministic one thanks to the decisional and thus 
performative character of justice. Because decisions are performative, probabilities 
become deterministic: they produce the world they predict. To show this, I would 
like to turn to a discussion regarding the specific performativity of decision-making 
based on predictions and analyze what changes occur in the reality beyond the ones 
affecting the judged individual.
By taking the recidivism risk of an individual into account for sentencing, we are 
determining the future of this individual based, as we have seen in the previous sec-
tion, on predictions tied to data that are not exclusively theirs. Because decisions are 
performative, by choosing between one or another outcome (prison or probation), 
we take probabilities as if they were deterministic: a given individual is predicted 
to recidivate and will thus be sentenced to prison as if they actually had reoffended. 
This decision supposes the existence of something, the future reoffense, that is not 
and cannot be, as the individual is now in prison.
10 As Michel Foucault demonstrated in Discipline & Punish (Foucault, 2012), this critique against pris-
ons is as old as prisons themselves and is fully part of the constant reformation process of the prison 
complex.
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Earlier, I called attention to the striking formulation by Northpointe that I repeat 
here: “The purpose of the risk scales is prediction—the ability to discriminate 
between offenders who will and will not recidivate (emphasis mine)” (Northpointe 
Inc., 2015, p. 7). Northpointe’s use of the indicative instead of the conditional tense 
confirms the imperceptible shift from probability to determinism previously dis-
cussed. This shift is enabled by overlooking the performative power of decisions. 
However, the connection established between prediction and determinism by the use 
of the future tense becomes more than an imprecise use of language when COM-
PAS gets used for the purpose of sentencing. By deciding, and thus performatively 
determining the present based on past data, one confirms the past state as the norm 
in light of which the future is preemptively understood as having taken place. There-
fore, the past is that which will repeat itself simply because it once was the case.
In addition, the connection between a possible and an inescapable future is mate-
rially realized when, by modifying the future of an individual based on predictions, 
one creates new data that will eventually be added to the dataset serving to train the 
algorithm. As I am about to show, the more we judge on the basis of predictions, the 
more we produce auto-confirming data, and the more the reality will fit the data.
Let us draw on the case of the false positives: an individual is predicted to reof-
fend within 2 years but will not reoffend. This is nothing unexpected as individuals 
do defy the outcome predicted by the risk assessment tool in a high percentage of 
cases. In the case of COMPAS and of non-expert human beings’ predictions, false 
positives for Black individuals amount to 40.4% as opposed to 25.4% for white indi-
viduals (Dressel & Farid, 2018, p. 2). I have already pointed out how social injus-
tice and racism are reflected in these numbers. Let us now proceed with a thought 
experiment: the case of a male individual called Y. Y was excluded from probation 
measures because of his high risk to reoffend based on his history and on his COM-
PAS scores.11 Instead, Y is sentenced to prison. What kind of data does this case 
produce? The data confirm the connection between the prediction of a high risk of 
recidivism and sentencing to prison time. But Y could have belonged to the class of 
false positives. The issue is that we will never know if this is the case, as Y was not 
granted probation, and was sent to prison. There is a good chance that Y is among 
the 40.4% of “outliers” who defy the predictions. However, the possibility of being 
an outlier to the prediction has been materially excluded by his prison sentencing. It 
is now impossible to find out if Y would have reoffended or not within 2 years, and 
thus impossible to rectify future predictions. Y’s case cannot belong to the false pos-
itives anymore. As a result, decisions based on predictions systematically eliminate 
the false positive outliers. The predictions leading to a false negative are the only 
ones whose rectitude can be checked in real life. Let us pursue the thought experi-
ment: male individual Z was predicted not to reoffend within 2  years and put on 
probation but ends up reoffending. Consequently, the result of the predictive algo-
rithm was inaccurate and needs to be corrected, which in cybernetic terms is called 
“negative feedback.”
11 This has been the case in State of Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis, 2016, §19 for instance.
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While the data produced in the case of Y solely confirms the correlation between 
prediction of recidivism and sentence to prison, the data produced in the case of Z 
will lead the algorithm to correct future predictions in order to avoid false negatives, 
leading to harsher predictions. This tendency will happen as soon as data resulting 
from algorithmic predictions are themselves integrated into the risk assessment tool. 
Following the mechanism of feedback loops, false positives are progressively elimi-
nated, while false negatives lead to the correction of the algorithm, which results in 
more sentences to prison rather than releases on probation.
With the generalization of the use of predictive algorithms, no data will be pro-
duced that are not themselves the result of predictive mechanisms. The more data 
produced through predictive algorithms are fed back into the norm dataset, the 
more new predictions will reflect the absence of false positives and the necessity 
to avoid false negatives. As a result, less and less individuals should be predicted as 
non-reoffenders.
3.3  Justice as Risk Management
By change what the policy deputies mean is contingency, risk, flexibility, and 
adaptability to the groundless ground of the hollow capitalist subject, in the 
realm of automatic subjection that is capital. […] This economy is powered by 
constant and automatic insistence upon the externalization of risk, the place-
ment at an externally imposed risk of all life, so that work against risk can be 
harvested without end. Stefano Harney & Fred Moten, The Undercommons: 
Fugitive Planning & Black Study, pp. 76–77.
In my third and final argument, I aim to show that decision-making premised 
on predictive algorithms performs a certain understanding of the function of jus-
tice. In this understanding, justice is not about fairness; neither is it about retribu-
tion or rehabilitation. Rather, it functions as an apparatus for the biopolitical regula-
tion of risks. The judged individual in their irreplaceable singularity is secondary 
to this purpose. The connection I would like to establish here is the one between 
biopolitics—understood as the management by the state of the life and death of a 
population—and a preemptive form of cybernetics. Traditionally, cybernetic sys-
tems are characterized by their self-regulation in order to maintain the stability of 
their organization against the tendency toward energetic dispersion or chaos called 
entropy (Wiener, 1989). The specificity of preemptive systems is that their regula-
tion consists of anticipatively avoiding something that has not yet happened. In order 
to understand this mechanism, it is necessary to clarify what making a decision con-
sists of, and what characterizes a decision based on a prediction.
The definition of decision I offer here is loosely based on Jacques Derrida’s Force 
of Law (Derrida, 1990, p. 961f.) and Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence (Ben-
jamin, 1996). A decision etymologically consists in performing a cut (Latin, de-
cidere) within a complex reality with the help of a calculation following a set of 
rules in order to determine what will or will not be. At the same time, a decision is 
composed of the interpretation of these rules and the results of the calculation based 
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on them. Indeed, if a decision were solely the result of a calculation, it would not be 
a decision. For instance, that 4 is the result of 2 + 2 is not a decision, only the result 
of a computation following a rule. To be a decision, a speech act must be more than 
computation.12
Let us unpack this attempt at a definition. While predictive algorithms like COM-
PAS compute the risk of an individual’s recidivism, they contribute to but do not 
perform the decision strictly speaking as they provide a calculation without its inter-
pretation. Predictions are expressed in the form of probabilities stretching from 0 
(= will not happen) to 1 (= will happen). However, as demonstrated in the previous 
arguments, there cannot be a 0 or 1 probability of reoffending, as there is no way to 
gain absolute certainty regarding the future of a given individual. Because there can 
be no absolute certainty regarding the risk of an individual’s recidivism, there can 
be no calculation of where to “make the cut.” In contrast to predictions, the decision 
is binary. Deciding consists in turning the x% chance of an individual to reoffend 
into either a “will” (= 0) or “will not” (= 1) reoffend, and thus will or will not be sent 
to prison. The judge makes a cut by interpreting and evaluating the output of the 
algorithm.
Since there can be no certainty regarding the recidivism of an individual—no 
calculation of where to “make the cut”—the decision regarding the individual can 
never be entirely justified by computation and is, in that sense, ungroundable. Again, 
if a decision were to be fully grounded in computation, it would not be a decision 
(as in the case of 2 + 2 = 4). Therefore, each actual decision entails an interpreta-
tion with its measure of arbitrariness. It bears the risk of being wrong and comes 
with the responsibility associated with this risk. Because it can be wrong, a decision 
marks the limits of computation.
While predictive algorithms may mitigate the risk of making a wrong decision, 
they can never eliminate this risk because they cannot substitute for the measure of 
arbitrariness in every interpretation, which accounts for the never entirely ground-
able character of a decision. The use of predictive algorithms conceals that an 
interpretation happens each and every time a decision is made. This concealment 
contributes to the idea that justice could be reduced to the automatic application of 
rules.
We have previously established that a decision is performative. Let us now 
specify what is performed when a judicial decision is rendered. As we have 
seen, judicial decisions are performative in the sense that they reshape the life of 
the judged individual and the community that surrounds them. At the same time, 
in order to produce such an effect, the decision reaffirms the legal order and the 
context granting its performative power. A decision referring to an existing rule 
reinstates the legitimacy of the rule that serves to justify the decision—implying 
a circularity that underlines the necessary violence of the law (Derrida, 1990, 
p. 987; Benjamin, 1996). In consequence, deciding does not only entail deter-
mining what will be, it implies at the same time performatively reaffirming the 
12 As Derrida points out, a decision is free and thus responsible only if it is not solely the automatic 
application of a rule but interprets and thus “invents” the rule anew every time (Derrida, 1990, p. 961).
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normative context in which the decision takes place and makes sense, a context 
without which the decision would have no legitimacy.
The normative context that is performatively reaffirmed by a decision based 
on predictive algorithms is risk management. By entrusting predictive algo-
rithms to help make decisions in the judicial context, one displaces the idea 
of justice as that which is tied to an always-singular situation necessitating a 
specific interpretation of the law (Derrida, 1990, p. 948) toward, instead, an 
automatized mechanism of regulation and modulation of risks—be it the 
risks that criminality is considered to represent for society, or the risks tied to 
the consequences of a wrong or unfair decision. Ezekiel Dixon-Román et  al. 
describe this management of risks in terms of cost minimization: “In other 
words, incorrectly identifying an individual as high-risk, and making decisions 
regarding the nature of that individual’s probation and parole accordingly, is 
considered less costly than failing to identify someone who goes on to commit 
a ‘serious offense’ as defined above” (Dixon-Román et al., 2019, p. 31). How to 
explain this prioritization of risk management in judicial procedures over and 
above any regard for the judged individual? Antonia Majaca and Luciana Par-
isi conceive of the form of governmentality that makes use of predictive algo-
rithms as “paranoid,” tying it to the “white male subject of humanism” (Majaca 
& Parisi, 2016, p. 4). This kind of governmentality emerged from a sense of 
permanent threat tied to the 9/11 attack and is marked by the desire to act based 
on what is not known (Amoore, 2013, p. 55 f.). Lorraine Daston leads the gen-
eralization of predictive algorithms further back to the context of “Cold War 
rationality,” where the risk of a nuclear catastrophe was mitigated by universal 
algorithmic procedures and the idea that everyone played the same game by 
the same rules. Daston describes “Cold War rationality” as a rationality relying 
on a set of rules that can be applied mechanically without interpretation, judg-
ment, or deliberation.13
While this sense of paranoia and general suspicion inherited from the Cold War 
and 9/11 can partly explain the generalization of the use of predictive algorithms, I 
would argue that they are part of a biopolitical mechanism set in motion during the 
nineteenth century. Risk management—a logic nowadays shared by financial institu-
tions, insurance companies, and the criminal justice system—functions as a “pro-
ductive” tool (in the Foucauldian sense) for population management at the service of 
biopolitical governance.
The notion of risk management is connected to a cybernetic conception of 
society. Modulating risks is part and parcel of a society that, since the nineteenth 
13 Lorraine Daston, “The Rule of Rules, or How Reason Became Rationality,” talk at the Wissenschaft-
skolleg zu Berlin, November 21, 2010. Referred to in Majaca and Parisi (2016). Appeared in the first 
chapter of the collective book (Erickson et al., 2013) under the title “Enlightenment Reason, Cold War 
Rationality, and the Rule of Rules.”.
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century, functions biopolitically. Here, we might remember that the aim of biopower 
is not to discipline bodies on the individual level; its goal is to establish regulating 
mechanisms from within the population in order to attain an equilibrium, “some-
thing like a homeostasis,” writes Foucault, using cybernetic terminology (Foucault, 
1997, p. 249).
From a cybernetic standpoint, living and mechanical processes obey the 
same logic: both are systems that regulate their relation to their environment 
through feedback mechanisms that enable them to maintain their internal 
organization against the system’s tendency for energy dispersion or chaos (Wie-
ner, 1989). Placed in this cybernetic context, predictive algorithms function as 
a naturalized means to maintain social homeostasis. The difference between 
traditional cybernetic systems and preemptive systems, however, is that in tra-
ditional cybernetic systems, the system regulates itself in light of events that 
have already happened and whose results are fed back into the system in order 
for it to adapt to a changing situation. By anticipating risks, preemptive systems 
regulate themselves relative to that which has not happened yet. They exclude 
in advance any event that could imperil an already given equilibrium, or more 
precisely, the norm that is at work in this equilibrium. And in order to protect 
themselves from hypothetical future risks, preemptive systems agree to expose 
the disenfranchised to actual risks in the present—be it the risks tied to predic-
tive policing (Harcourt, 2007), to a life in prison, to unpayable health insur-
ance, to homelessness and poverty.
As cited in the epigraph of this section, Stefano Harney and Fred Moten 
emphasize in The Undercommons that neoliberal capitalism is a mode of 
governance which submits disenfranchised, precarious Black and Brown 
lives to increasingly higher levels of contingency and flexibility—putting 
these lives at risk and making any kind of autonomous organization and 
planning increasingly difficult.14 Similarly, in Society Must Be Defended 
(Foucault, 2003), Foucault describes racism as the way for biopower to let 
a part of the unwanted population die by exposing it to multiple risks of 
death or to political death by exclusion. By the sustained exposure of dis-
enfranchised populations to risks by means of risk management tools, the 
government exerts its biopolitical prerogative to let die in order to maintain 
its perverse homeostasis.
4  Conclusion: for Abolition
Races are not a given. Instead, even construed as biological as is still 
often the case in the USA (Vyas et  al., 2020), they are the products and 
effects of biopolitical technologies of differentiation and hierarchization 
14 See also Martin (2011, p. 260).
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applied to populations. Predictive algorithms are not only iteratively per-
forming racial biases; they are producing the conditions of possibility 
for racial differences and hierarchies by automatically maintaining the 
disenfranchised in the never-ending present of crime, prison, and politi-
cal exclusion, while the open future remains reserved for the privileged 
population still catered to on an individual basis. Determinism, here, is 
not the expression of the accuracy of the knowledge that complex algo-
rithms would have gained over individuals—much like the series Minority 
Report and Westworld would present it. Rather, understood as the denial 
of an individual’s right to a degree of self-determination, determinism 
is manufactured through predictive decision-making. By algorithmically 
excluding futures based on past data, predictive tools are at their very 
core conservative. Predictive algorithms are technological means of pro-
duction and reproduction of social homeostasis, transforming society into 
a program, an algorithm that f lattens the future of the disenfranchised 
into one inescapable present. In consequence, the abolition of predictive 
algorithms is necessary.
As argued from the beginning of this paper, abolishing a dispositive never 
solely means repealing the concrete material stuff from which the dispositive 
is made—here, the risk assessment tools—but in addition, repealing the social 
conditions that give the dispositive its apparent necessity. At issue in the pre-
sent case is a society that accepts to systematically expose the disenfranchised 
to actual risks in the present in order to avoid hypothetical future risks in order 
to maintain its equilibrium. Abolishing the “program” of current society, which 
obeys a cybernetic-preemptive logic, is the only way forward, toward the pos-
sibility of opening futures in the now. Abolishing is a call to imagine justice 
otherwise.
Appendix
Northpointe COMPAS risk assessment, offender #: 01cr57 (August 14, 
2006). Retrieved on November 20, 2018, from https:// assets. docum entcl oud. 
org/ docum ents/ 28392 40/ Sample- Risk- Asses sment- COMPAS- Resul ts. pdf
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